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Introduction
Our central argument in this paper is that the recognition of
African squatter's in settlements such as Crossroads and KTC as
permament urban residents demonstrates the victory of these
squatter struggles and that of popular resistance against
removals. They also challenge the wisdom of dividing the workers
into 'legals' and 'illegals' in one country, for the purpose of
reproducing 'the South African social formation as a whole and,
at its very heart, to reproduce certain forms of control over
labour.' 1
The squatters' struggles in Cape Town since the mid-1970s,
demonstrate: a sense of collective action which is reinforced by
their common plight as discarded people in the city; an embryonic
consciousness about the necessity of alliances to strengthen and
advance their struggles against removals; and, the fact that the
state will skilfully exploit their weaknesses in order to divide
and set them against each other. In South Africa there are few
popular struggles that have made a landmark in history without
the echoing sounds of guns and bullets. Those in monopoly of the
state's coercive force, chase their fellow citizens during unrest
periods as if a snake chasing a rat. They shoot to kill as though
a hunter shooting a prey in the bush.
These events have led to the advent of what Lambert and Webster
call 'militaristic voluntarism' of the youth 2 which has at times
eclipsed organisational concerns and sandwiched trade unionists
and community activists between their militarism and the terror
tactics of the security forces. The behaviour of the youth
outside progressive organisations at KTC squatter camp since
1985, is a- living testimony in- many people's minds, which
demonstrates the validity of Lambert and Webster's observations.
To enable a broader understanding of the KTC struggles it is
necessary to situate them within-the current crisis which Bundy
defines as involving * a combination of strains and malfunctions
so acute that existing.institutions cannot resolve them. Old
practises lose their validity and old beliefs cease to carry
convictions'-3 . A combination of factors fused together to bring
about this crisisr economic performance declined; opposition to
the tri-cameral reform elections undermined the credibility of
the state; and, the international community is gradually losing
faith with apartheid. -
Popular struggles against the Botha Reforms
If: there, was.anything positive about the reform initiatives of
1983, it was that they served as an issue that unified the
opposition forces across class-divides and ideological polemics.
Middle class organisations were vocal in their condemnation of
Botha's co-option of the coloured and Indian puppets into the
parliamentary process. These groups argued for the dismantling of
apartheid and a start to the process of genuine negotiations with
credible leaders of the people, as if the struggle was only
against apartheid. Liberal organisations were also quick to
condemn the exclusion of Africans in this process. UDF and
National Forum affiliates were actively opposed to the new
reforms; trade unions opposed the new constitution because it
sought to divide the workers into migrant and urban categories.
Opposition was indeed broad and unifying at the simplest level.
Low percentage polls at the tricameral elections indicate the
success of the campaign against the new constitution: the
official percentage polls were 30% for the House of
Representatives and 20% for the House of Delegates; calculated
by the UDF as a proportion of the total Indian and Coloured
population over the age of 18, as recorded in the 1980 census;
the adjusted figures showed that only 1^.5% of the Coloured
people, and 15.5% of the Indians, had voted.4
But this success varied from region to region. In the Western
Cape, the campaign not only depended on the organisations'
ability to mobilise their constituencies but also on the ability
of the activists to theorise and to develop effective tactics and
strategies. Debates were lively and creative at the time. The
main strategies employed were: to isolate certain target areas
for pamphleteering drives; hold meetings against reform and call
for UDF support; encourage the youth to help blitz Mitchell's
plain with UDF pamphlets as a focal point in the campaign since
it was regarded by some ideologues as 'coloured homeland.'UDF
then- focused on this area for a motorcade [in which those with
cars, the white left, were to drive around displaying UDF
posters]; the media was also informed in advance through a press
conference in order to give adequate pubilicity to the campaign.
At some of the polls, some voters crossed the floor to join those
singing freedom songs rather than voting.
The tactics of opposition to the community council elections were
somewhat different from the basically middle class methods
mentioned. There were no white left activists nor motorcades or
pressmen for publicity. Elections took place in community halls,
centres and administration board offices. When activists and
their supporters entered the election venues singing freedom
songs, the police were quick to label them as 'intimidators' and
to instruct them to disperse-. Others went to the tables and
scrutinised the list of candidates as though they were to vote
but complained that they did not see the name of Mandela whom
they came to vote for. This infuriated community council
candidates. Acrimonious exchanges would follow between candidates
and activists. White policemen stood by, mutely, since they did
not understand Xhosa. Only when the tension reached fever pitch
did they intervene, but before they could ascertain what was
happening, the crowd would break into a freedom song and follow
the activists to other poll stations. In the case of Kwezi centre
in Guguletu, the hall was left empty except for the pensioners
who had no alternative but to vote since they had been carried to
the polls in the councillor's cars, hired taxis and buses paid
for by the administration board. Sometimes a comrade would ask
for permission to use the microphone to address the people on the
role of the community councils. Elated at the interest, the
councillors would agree and ask, 'Have you already voted?' When
the answer was 'Yes', the comrades had no difficulty in getting
hold of the microphone to explain that the councillors were
'puppets' and that a vote for them was to 'accept living in
matchbox houses, squalid conditions' and so-on. Again, the white
policemen looked on, without understanding. What was equally
interesting was that some of the black policemen would instead of
interpreting for the white policemen what the activists were
saying, secretly inform one of the activists that one of the
councillors was informing the police that a certain activist be
(arrested as he ran with his microphone after he fell victim of
the same tactic. The activists would again sing freedom songs as
they leave hiding the said activist among them.
At night these tactics were replaced by those of the 'suicide
squads' . A member of one such squad explained: 'That night at
about 11 pm [after the community council elections] we went to
Khakhaza's house. We petrol bombed it after realising the shop
could not burn. We first threw them [petrol bombs] through the
front windows. When the house started burning, we ran to throw
them at the back. That woman was lucky. I wanted to throw it into
her face, but she was quick in closing the door.'-* Khakhaza's
house was attacked because he was one of the leading community
councillors in Guguletu.
This militancy is observed by L. Chisholm when she writes,
'As townships ignited one by one, ...forms of
student and youth activities changed. They are
fighting back, arming themselves and commandeering
petrol stations and trucks to confront state armed
forces.'6
Lambert and Webster call this the 'militaristic voluntarism...of
the youth [which] eclipsed the organisational concerns [whereby]
trade unions and community activists have found themselves
sandwiched between the militarism of the youth and the terror
tactics of the security forces.'' These terror tactics were
clearly demonstrated in the destruction of KTC in 1986. Those
hard hit by these tactics of terror in the mid 1980s sought
refuge in KTC. There were several reasons for choosing KTC: the
streets in the township give easy access to special branch that
picks up comrades in ungodly hours of the morning; Old
Crossroads could no longer serve as a refuge base as Ngxobongwana
was hosting vigilantes; KTC was experiencing a phase of
political radicalism.
The origins of KTC squatters .
The KTC squatter camp started in late January 1983 '...with a few
families in make-shift shelters but it soon mushroomed into a new
community housed in shelters built of "Port Jackson" branches,
plastic and canvas. This was a form of protest by people who were
determined to persist for as long as it took them to obtain
houses and "legal rights" to be in Cape Town.8
From interviews with some of those who started squatting at KTC
the following accounts were presented, 'I was approached in my
capacity as an activist by Sis* Rina and Sis Sybil. They
complained that their shelters were demolished by the Bantu
Affairs Administration Board [BAAB] officials; that they had been
on the waiting list for a long time and couldn't understand why
their shelters were demolished while others had been allowed to
build and stay there.''
The people who were allowed to stay at KTC with the permission of
the BAAB officials were those who had temporary permits since
'KTC was used as an official transit camp for people who had
temporary permits as well as visitors from the bantustans in the
1970s'.0 According to Dr. M. Nash, there were at this time about
a hundred dwellings at KTC for those who were on the waiting list
for housing. During the demolitions, those transit houses were
never demolished. The Urban Foundation appeared to provide
rudimentary services such as water and the bucket system for
sewage. Those people with permits were given full rights to be in
Cape Town in 1981 and the transit camp was growing as more people
got permits to stay. This is what confused the women who came
to see a youth activist to find out why their shacks had been
demolished. As he himself was a lodger, he decided not only to
help the women but to be part and parcel in the struggle for
housing and the occupation of KTC land.
The activist introduced the women to other youth activists, the
United Women's Organisation and the Western Cape Civic
Association. Within a week, these organisations had called a
meeting which was held in the church at Ny 78, opposite KTC.
Several hundreds of people from Guguletu and KTC attended the
meeting. The meeting resolved that' KTC was an alternative place
for them to build houses as the housing shortage was acute.
Indeed, the Argus reported that, 'Since 1972 no houses have been
built for Peninsula blacks in the established townships of
Nyanga, Langa and Guguletu'.
Within a few days after the meeting hundreds of people came from
the 'hokkies' or outrooms of the townships to build plastic
shacks at KTC. The Argus estimated the shelters to be more than
1000 by February 1983. ' Most of the people interviewed said they
were Cape Town residents who had moved to KTC because their
families' homes were overcrowded. Some went to KTC because they
were tired of lodging in 'another man's house as if a boy'14 Most
of the youth interviewed had passes, and, in this respect
qualified in every respect to be in Cape Town. This bears out
the Argus' view that 'Most people in the squatter camp at KTC are
legally in the Peninsula, even in terms of the governments barbed
wire fence influx control legislation.'15
Another group of people who came to live at KTC were the new
arrivals from Transkei who fled from Mr. Ngxobongwana's
autocratic powers in 1983 as he was purging opposition in
Crossroads. The majority of these people were presumably without
passes because according to Dr. Nash, when Unibel and Modderdam
squatter camps were destroyed 'Those who went to stay in
Crossroads did not have passes.1*"
KTC became a contested terrain for hegemony to exercise control
over the area. There were people with traditional attitudes and
others with urban consciousness especially the militant youth;
oppositional politics from progressive organisations such as Cape
Youth Congress [CAYCO], United Women's Organisation [UWO] Western
Cape Civic Association [WCCA] and there were community
councillors. This can be clearly demonstrated when one looks at
the nature of their responses to repression.
Survival strategies 1983-1984
The earlier phase of KTC squatters' struggles, from February 1983
saw an embryonic alliance between different groups with different
origins and experiences fighting for their sectional interests
under the umbrella of Cape Town's women, youth and civic
organisations. There were people with rural backgrounds as well
as city backgrounds grappling with issues that confronted them
and gave them new experience. Experience is used here as 'an
occurence or episode as it is lived by the participants, the
subjective texture of objective actions' 1' Firstly the activists
from the organisations mentioned above, who were working as an
informal committee, saw that the number of people who were moving
to KTC was growing quickly. They therefore called a mass meeting
of the KTC people so as to form a co-ordinating committee which
could organise this growth. This committee,comprised of 'legals'
and 'illegals' conducted negotiations with the BAAB officials.
The mandate given to it was that 'people wanted houses to live in
whether they were "legals" or "illegals"; that it was the duty of
the government to build them houses'1''.
A few activists were opposed ,to the strategy of negotiations
with the Western Cape Administration Board (WCAB). The majority
of these activists came from UWO, which was a non-racial
organisation. Some of them were ANC members before it was banned.
The fact that.ANC was banned had little effect on the praxis of
these activists as it was not an offence to propagate the ideas
enshrined in the Freedom Charter, which is ANC s guiding document
for dismantling apartheid in South Africa. These women did not
hesitate to propagate the ideas of the Freedom Charter in their
speeches at KTC. This explains the fact that the majority of
women at KTC were members of UWO. The second group of activists
were members of the WCCA. That the civic leadership was comprised
of individuals influenced by both black consciousness ideas and
the Freedom Charter had little effect on KTC as the former group
never took KTC squatter struggles seriously. In any case, they
are a minority group in Cape Town. The third group was the youth
activists from different organisations such as Azaso, Cosas, high
school SRCs, Cayco and drama groups in the township. All these
activists were Charterist inclined. That as it may, the activists
who provided direction in the KTC campaign at this stage were
those from the WCCA as it was felt that the housing problem was
to be addressed by the civic. They argued that the WCAB was
acting on the instruction of the state to implement and supervise
policies determined by parliament; that a negative answer from
the WCAB would be detrimental to the unity already achieved as it
would have the effect of making other people lose hope in the
campaign which was only starting; that the committee should
consider negotiations only when it has demonstrated the strength
of its followers. This position did not seem favourable to the
majority of the people. So the mandate had to be carried.
The committee reported back to KTC people that the WCAB's
response was that: it was illegal for them to squat; they should
have consulted first with their 'leaders' i.e. the community
councillors; not all of them had a right to be in Cape Town;
they should as soon as possible, leave the place if they did not
want to be arrested. The KTC people refused to be intimidated by
the WCAB. They resolved to: continue squatting; seek support from
other progressive organisations; and to publicise their campaign.
At dawn, the following day KTC was raided. The wood and
plastic shelters were destroyed by the WCAB officials who were
accompanied by the armed police and their dogs. People watched
passively as their belongings were thrown together into various
heaps and then set alight by the WCAB officials. People including
some activists, dissappeared into the bush for fear of being
arrested. When the WCAB officials realised that none of the
squatters' belongings could be retrieved from the fire, they left
the place under police escort in their vans. It was then that the
people, under severe shock and confusion started to regroup. They
were caught defenseless as they had no strategy about how to
respond to a raid.
From the above-mentioned raid onwards, activists and some
members of the committee started to demonstrate their skills.
Volunteers were dispatched to charity organisations to request
help such as food, blankets, plastics, etc. and to rally support
from progressive organisations, whereby they could be allowed to
address meetings about the plight of KTC squatters. Township
activists were encouraged to come and sleep at KTC. It was
Mildred Lesea's belief a former organiser of Sactu in Cape Town
who was a member of UWO, that 'if you want to win people to your
side; you better be with them in their struggles'.
The response was positive. That evening, plastics and wooden bars
were brought for people to rebuild their shelters. The youth
volunteered or was encouraged to do this kind of work as digging
required young men. The committee's shelter, large enough for 8-
12 people, and those for women, were the first to be built.
Others followed later. By midnight KTC was like Dingaan's Kraal:
the committe's shelter was in the centre surrounded by women's or
families' shelters with young children; activists and other young
people's shelters were on the outside, as they were expected to
be on guard at night. Some members of the UWO brought their
jointly cooked food to be shared by the squatters. The informal
sector of Section 4 was also profiteering by being in the
neighbourhood. People bought offal of sheep, goats or cattle at
10c a piece depending on the amount required to cook or fry.
Indeed that night, and a few days that followed were
symbolised by the spirit of comradeship and sharing. Activists
from UWO and Cayco advertised their organisations and propagated
their ideals. The youth speakers were not hesitant in their
propagation of the ideals of the Freedom Charter. People
responded positively, singing church or freedom songs.
However, the above mentioned unity and harmony did not last long.
KTC became a victim of subsequent daily dawn raids that continued
for several months into the winter rainy season.'19 In some cases
tear gas, police dogs and batons were used to disperse and arrest
the KTC squatters. The state's resolve not to tolerate squatters
settlement at KTC was clearly demonstrated in Minister of Plural
Relations and Development Dr Koornhof's statement that 'Neither
I, nor this government, will allow another uncontrolled squatter
camp like Crossroads to develop.'20 Five days later, after this
statement, KTC was again raided. This time the KTC squatters were
on guard as they devised a better strategy of resistance. The
previous week's demolition of the shelters demonstrated that even
if the WCAB officials were seen from a distance by their guards,
there was little they could do to save their shelters. Since
then, the KTC squatters would only start rebuilding at night.
These shelters were different from those of the past and the
defence strategy was equally effectcive. The shelters were built
such that they could be undone within a few minutes. This time
the bars were not buried deep down in the ground so that they
could be easily pulled off the ground; the plastic were also
treated with caution as it was only sand thrown on top of their
bottoms instead of burying them in the ground; there were groups
of volunteers with different tasks such as saving the bars,
plastics, utensils etc. These volunteers would hide them in the
place that was secured as a safe place for keeping them until it
was safe to bring them back to rebuild at night. The pass-holders
agreed not to produce them so that there should be no
distinctions made between 'legals' and 'illegals' and the
struggle was one i.e. houses and a place to live. Cape Times
reported that: 289 people-47 of them children were arrested;
about 150 of them pleaded not guilty; about 80 of them were led
in groups of 10 until Commissioner L. Van Wyck read the names of
the rest out in court, because of 'lateness of the hour'; a
second charge of not producing the pass on request, was put to
the first 50 cases 21. The majority of the Committee Members were
among those arrested.
Meanwhile the WCAB officials and their surrogates i.e. the
community councillors were sowing seeds of division among the KTC
squatters. This is what the committee tried to avert before the
raid. When the 'Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr.
Piet Koornhof, announced... that rudimentary services would be
provided at 2,500 sites at the KTC squatter camp and adjascent to
it,' 2 the activists were more worried about his statement
threatening that neither he nor his government would tolerate
another uncontrolled squatter camp like Crossroads. They knew
that the arrests and deportation of 'illegals' meant that the
service sites were for 'legals'. They were equally disappointed
by the opportunism of the 'legals' who only showed their faces at
their convenience and dissappeared into the townships as they had
friends and relatives to sleep at. The 'illegals' were equally
aware of how different their situation was. KTC was their home
with nowhere else to go. To avert the divisions that were
awaiting the KTC squatters, the committee, in a joint meeting
with UWO and WCCA activists decided that a list of names be kept
and that the first people to get the sites should be those who
always slept at KTC. This seemed to be a better tactic as the
majority of people who were sleeping at KTC and getting arrested
were those who were desperate for the houses.
Two weeks later when the influential committee members were
released, they were too late to continue preserving the unity
they sacrificed for. Two squatter camps were in existence. The
WCAB officials knew very well that the raids and demolitions were
not enough to stop people from squatting as the estimated backlog
of housing in African Townships was 6,000 in Cape Peninsula
alone.2^ They sought to achieve their desires by sowing the seeds
of division in KTC. After several visits at KTC, they warned the
'legals' that they were wasting their time in mixing with
'illegals'. Soon after that the KTC people were divided into
'Camp A' which was a mixture of 'legals' and 'illegals' and 'Camp
B' which comprised of 'legals' only. The latter group formed its
own committee as the majority of the committee members remained
with 'Camp A'. There were now two committees and two camps on
one site, operating independently.
The WCAB soon summoned the two committees to its offices in
March. They were told that out of the 2,500 sites, the first 200
were going to be given to the 'legals' as the government was
unable to arrange 2,500 sites at once and was not in a position
to give priority to 'illegals'. The 'A Camp' committee rejected
this while the 'B Camp' committee accepted the offer with
enthusiasm. Two days later, 'Camp A' was raided and those without
passes were arrested. In protest, the 'legals' refused to produce
their passes and they were also arrested.. 'Camp B' was given a
breathing space this time since it was comprised of 'legals'
only. Those who were left behind in 'Camp A' lost leadership and
became further divided. A third group, called 'Camp C , was
formed" as 'legals' again broke away from 'Camp A'. The latter was
then left with 'illegals' only.
The- WCAB officials then came to give sites to the legals,
'Camp B and Camp C each having 100. There developed tension
within 'Camp A' Committee as it was still comprised of 'legals'
and 'illegals' whilst its constituency was comprised of
'illegals' only. The members of the Committee who were 'legals'
later observed that they were excluded from attending meetings
which were held at night by the 'illegals'. When WCAB officials
raided the camp, around the first week of March 1983,^  the
'illegals' came out of their shelters with "knobkerries" and iron
bars to resist the demolition of their shelters. The police used
tear gas to. disperse them- and they- ran- into the bush to- escape
the fumes. Since then, KTC became an object, of arrests and raids.
Although this incident impressed the 'legals' who were in the
'Camp A' Committee, making them more loyal to it, the 'illegals'
continued to exclude them and were by then consulting lawyers
without the knowledge of the 'legals'. When they approached the
'illegals' who were Committee members, asking to be informed
about developments as Committee members, they were surprised to
be told, 'Comrades it does not help you to stay with us. You are
having passes, and we have none. You are fighting for one thing,
houses and we are fighting for two - houses and passes. Is it not
better for you to join the other people with passes because it
seems that you are retarding our struggle?'. After this it
became an accepted reality that there were three groups operating
independently at KTC. The activists in the Youth, feeling
betrayed by the 'illegals' in 'Camp A', disgusted by the
conservatism and sectional interests of the 'legals' in both
Camps B and C lost interest in KTC struggles.
It was as if Dr. Koornhof was kept to date about the
developments at KTC squatter camp. Less than two weeks after the
splits at KTC, he announced that no more than the original 200
sites would be made available at KTC. The remaining thousands of
people would have to wait while the government created a new
township at Driftsands," now known as Kayalitsha.
After this, opposition was at its weakest. There were no
longer any activists from the 'legals' to encourage the illegals
by refusing to produce passes and thus risking arrest. The WCAB
officials also knew who their victims were; they constantly
raided,- demolished the 'illegals's' shelters and arrested those
who failed to escape.
Perhaps the closing chapter of KTC squatters' embryonic
opposition to removals was that demonstrated by the 'Concerned
Citizens' ' visit from the white areas. Rev. Sid Lucket explains
how this came about: 'I knew that the Women's Movement for Peace
was having a meeting in protest against the demolitions. I rushed
to St. Saviours Church in Claremont to inform them that KTC was
about to be raided"again so that they could come and see with
their own eyes what was taking place.
It appears that the above mentioned meeting was attended not
only by those who were members of the Women's Movement for Peace,
but also by some members of parliament. Those who had no cars
were given lifts and many white women and men descended on KTC
They not only surprised the KTC people with their enthusiasm but
also served as a rallying factor. People from houses nearby KTC
came out and started to follow the flashy cars to KTC. Those
activist who had lost hope came out of their hovels to revitalise
the spiritless 'iltegals' who were sitting down, surrounded by
barbed wire, awaiting their hour of doom.
KTC was soon ringing- with freedom songs. The whites entered
the camp of the- 'illegals' ancT this helped to unify everybody in
KTC as the 'legals', wha had been given sites, joined them. The
African people appeared more relaxed in the presence of whites as
they saw this as a kind of protection from police attack. This
was specially so when they observed the presence of the
parliamentarians - Ken Andrew, Di Bishop and Helen Suzman. Since
these whites were in some way - directly or indirectly - involved
in the making of the government's influx control laws, it was
reasoned that they must have some influence with the police.
Then police came.- They were not in the. least hesitant in
breaking the weak chain of non-racial protest around the KTC
people. While this chain may grow and become characteristic of
the daily battles with the state forces as long as the crisis
continues, on this occasion it was no match for the police. They
told the crowd that their gathering was illegal and that they
should disperse. The freedom songs became louder and louder, as
if to give the people more spiritual power. Indirectly, the
statements of the police were making the people more defiant.
Then Mr. Ken Andrew, an MP, appointed himself as mediator between
the people and the police. But he was not successful. He came
back and persuaded the protesters to disperse as the police were
threatening to tear gas the crowd if they persisted with their
protest. But the KTC people had other plans: 'We circled the
whites and sang as vigorously as we could so that they couldn't
hear what he was saying. We wanted them to be with us when the
police tear gassed so that thay can also experience what the tear
gas feels like'.' Half the crowd of about 300-400 strong
managed to get across the fence and escape the teargas while
others were trapped by.the barbed wire as they tried to flee.
Indeed, some whites at least experienced, for the first time, how
refreshing the air is when polluted by tear gas. As people
scattered, running away from arrests, some women seem to have
lost track of their children. One of them screamed at the police
demanding to know where her child was. They told her that she was
a mad woman and arrested her for illegal squatting without
answering her question.
On 9th May, spotlights were.erected in the area to prevent
the rebuilding of shelters under cover of darkness. At dawn on
the 17th May, all squatters in the area were arrested. Those
'legals' willing to wait for houses in khayalitsha were taken to
the disused beerhalls in Nyanga and Langa. These beerhalls were
burnt down in the 1976 uprisings against Bantu Education. They
are now the memorials of the students' unrest in South Africa,
symbolising 'the year of fire the year of ash.' Since then,
except for a small group of people who started coming back, KTC
did not experience-any siginificant challenge to the police until
1985. .
Consolidation: The UDF, the Community Council and KTC
A significant development in 1984 was that of the UDF
campaigns. In the Western Cape, UDF became more popular among the
African townships and had more to gain with Oscar Mpetha as
President. He was seen as a unifying symbol not only among
working class but across class divides: the conservatives would
come to UDF mass meetings in the township to "listen to this old
10
man who has sacrificed his life to politics; democrats supported
him as a "charterist"; trade unions supported him as a worker who
was sometimes called a "veteran trade unionist".
UDF's strength lay in its opposition to the community
council elections. People identified and supported the campaign
as the councillors were linked to the never-ending deterioration
in their social and economic conditions. This campaign as
explained above was a success if one used the community council
elections as an indicator.
However successful as they were, UDF campaigns meant little
to the squatters who returned to KTC in the second half of 1983.
By this time, police violence, brutality and repression had made
the squatters turn to the community councils in the hope that
they may provide some relief. It seems that by this time the
"legals" without sites were tired of squatting as their shacks
would be demolished and told to go to Khayalitsha. They were also
tired of lodging with friends and relatives. One by one they
approached Mr Siqhaza, a member of the Community Council to ask
for a site. He gladly gave them sites for which they paid a rand.
Slowly, observers saw KTC mushrooming into a new community of
zinz shelters. Those who did not know about Siqhaza just came and
built their zinc shelters and Siqhaza would also come and
instruct the newcomer to demolish the shack unless the builder
was prepared to pay him his one rand and show him his/her pass.
The story spread like wildfire and KTC grew. The life stories of
the KTC squatters, Mncedisi and Suksuk give us more insight not
only into the relatively short-lived strategy of the BAAB to
boost .the Community Council at KTC but also into how misleading
the use of the term "illegals" can be. Both of these men said
that they had passes.
"We squatted with 'Camp A' because they were
our home boys and we did not like to see them
suffering in Cape Town. When we got work, it
was difficult for us to continue fighting with
them because if the police come, while we were
at work we would lose our things. We went to
Siqhaza and gave him RIO for a site."29
Marks and Rathbone have observed that " to deny these migrants
the appellation of working class because their consciousness was
still partially formed and infomrmed by their very recent
experience of contracting rural options, the onslaught of
African peasant production and social and political decay in the
countryside... is...a curiously mechanical, (and) Eurocentric
view"JD Certainly there was a growing sense of solidarity of a
working class sort among these migrants, though fed by homeboy
ties. It is not clear, however,' whether Siqhaza granted sites
only to those with passes and whether his charges for sites were
stable or varied.
The squatters of KTC near NY 78 seemed to have been given a
breathing space by the existence of the Community Councillor who
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not only charged them a rand or ten rand, but also recruited more
people to come and build if they had passes as he was going to
see to it that the WCAB provided them with adequate housing. •*•
But those of Memani at the edges of KTC near Nyanga were to
experience frequent harrassment by WCAB officials and police
throughout 1984. J. Cole has noted that, "Until May, not a week
went by without a raid on the approximately 250 squatters."32
The Informal Sector
An important development at KTC in this period of relative
freedom from police and WCAB raids was the growth of the
informal sector. There seem to be five main informal sector
activities that are income generating for the unemployed and
unemployable at KTC: drug pedalling; shebeening, backyard
mechanics, selling of meat, vegetables and fruit. Those involved
in the first two can be regarded as unemployable. They are also
KTC's informal "middle class" as they have large incomes from
these activities. I have observed both types of activity closely.
One day I went to a dealer who runs drugs not only for KTC but
also for the townships as well as some of the Coloured areas.
Within five minutes, she supplied seven independent customers.
What took her time was the counting of the money, since she sells
strictly on a "cash and carry" basis. The first customer wanted
twenty "parcels" at R11,00 each. Two old women came for twelve
parcels, three Coloured people wanted a bag which cost R950,00,
the seventh bought two parcels. We were then sent away because
business was hotting up and told to return in twenty minutes
time. Her turnover was R1324 in 20 or 30 minutes. She pays R500
per bag from Emampondweni in Transkei. Since we had come to
interview her about her experience at KTC and she had been too
busy to talk to us, she gave us R5 each as a consolation.
Liquor is an obvious source of income not only for KTC but also
for the majority of women in African townships. KTC is an
exception in that even during the week there are shebeens that
are open throughout the night. As long as there are people to buy
food and drink, the shebeens stay open.
What makes motor mechanics prosper is that these backyard
mechanics are jack-of-all-trades. They can fix engines, spray
paint and panel beat the bodies of cars. This means that they do
not only repair cars but "remodel" stolen cars to look totally
different and they get large "shares" for doing this. The success
of this racketeering is considerable when one considers how many
unemployed people in the township have cars and money to run
them.
Militancy and changing consciousness
By 1984 the youth had started to assert its position through
militant actions. 1985 saw enormous changes in the consciousness
of the squatters at KTC who had come under the influence of UDF
activists and the progressive youth. This was visible in the. way
they were running their lives as a community and challenging
corrupt leadership. Consciousness is used here as "the way in
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which experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in
traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms"-' One
such example is the establishment of "Peoples Courts" at KTC in
the late 1985 as an institution to handle the problems of KTC.
The youth was to put a lot of its energy into the People's Courts
and soon they had the effect of a semi-government in Cape Town's
townships as people took their cases there and its rulings were
observed by the greater township community. This recognition was
partly due to the nature of the severe punishments the courts
gave to offenders. One particular example is that of a man who
raped the eight year old child of his girlfriend while the latter
was at work. The girlfriend reported him to the "People's Court"
at KTC. The "Pick-up-Squad" went to fetch him from Section 2,
Guguletu. According to Mr. S who was the "magistrate" presiding
over the case,
"The people just listened and burst out in
shouts of 'Necklace!' for punishment.
Realising the danger of this as an activist,
in the case of the government discovering that
I was present when this punishment was given,
I had to motivate for a milder one. The
accepted one after a long disagreement was 300
lashes."34
According to Mr J., the offender screamed and defecated when he
was lashed; he was unable to walk and was using his hands and
knees to clean his excrement. Two weeks later, he came back to
apologise and said he was grateful that he was not given over to
the government and that he had not been necklaced.
Among the youth were activists who saw their role as changing
the attitudes and developing the political awareness of the
youth and then recruiting them into progressive organisations.
One of the means of attracting the youth to these organisations
was through mass funerals in which the political youth played a
leading part. Martin Hall observed that the "funerals of those
killed in confrontations regularly attracted large crowds of
mourners and open advocacy of the outlawed African National
Congress."35 The result of this was that activists found it
relatively easy to recruit the youth into organisations. The
youth of KTC chose to affiliate en masse to CAYCO. So every youth
in KTC was in theory a CAYCO member but in practice, their
individual actions were often shocking and would contradict CAYCO
principles. Recruitment was easy, but changing attitudes was not
something to be achieved within a day. Meanwhile freedom songs
and propagating the banned ANC and its leaders are the daily
political food of the youth of KTC. Bill Freund observed this
when he wrote: "in the market place of opposititon, what is
particularly remarkable is the revival of an untheorised and
uncritical anti-apartheid line trying to forge unity through as
little examination of this society as possible"36
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the severity of the punishment awaiting him if he lost the case,
requested ag activist to accompany him and to also plead his
innocence. ^
On the day of the hearing, the activist made the mistake of
challenging the 'Youth Brigades'' extension of jurisdiction to
Guguletu. This infuriated the 'Youth Brigade' court and he was
given twenty five lashes on his buttocks. The accused got fifty.
After this, the said activist and two others put their energies
into setting up a people's court' in KTC. When it was in
operation, several Cayco members participated in its
proceedings. It was agreed that its jurisdiction be restricted to
KTC; that those who belonged to progressive organisations be
reported to their organisations for disciplinary actions against
them; that the old people's case be taken by the WCCA. In short,
the activists who founded the People's Court at KTC saw it as a
structure for disciplining the youth that was operating outside
progressive organisations.
The fact that the activists who founded the KTC 'People's Court'
were members of Cayco meant that they could not always be present
at its proceedings as they had to also attend Cayco meetings. An
unemployed youth who won the KTC people's sympathies as a result
of birdshot that blinded him during police confrontations took
over the leadership of the KTC People's Court. He extended its
jurisdiction throughout the townships and to all groups
regardless of age. Shopkeepers were expected to contribute either
food or cash to keep it functioning.
In May 1986, one shopkeeper approached a group of activists and
complained to them, "I called you because I wanted to know
whether you are working together with the comrades in a blue
combi. Well, they are not violent, but ma-an! The kind of weapons
they carry! Last night they came here. Jumped over that fence
and came to knock through my window! They told me they were sent
by comrades from KTC People's Court to come and ask for bread.
Luckily, I was having two boxes of bread here so I gave it to
them. You know, they've been doing this for some time, so I
thought I must let you know. You know I lend my cars to the
comrades when they want to use them. But those ones, they also
want money. A lot of money on top of the bread I give them." He
did not look at the activists while he was talking to them as he
had tears in his eyes. They promised that something was going to
be done to stop them.
Each time the activists tried to intervene in the KTC People's
Court they were told it was non-aligned to any political
organisation and that only regular members should mitigate in the
proceedings of the case. The activists were indeed sandwiched.
This directionless militancy coincided with the old people's
fears of an attack. In addition to obtaining a Supreme Court
interdict to prevent an imminent attack on KTC, they also
resolved to arm themselves for defence purposes.
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Methods of Defence
"Let us use our money to buy arms." This was the statement of an
elderly person in one of the caucus groups that supplied arms to
the youth and leadership of the squatter camps. The manner in
which these arms were distributed is complicated. According to
those interviewed, there were activists whose task was to
constantly observe militants and to discover what the historical
background of such militant individuals were. If their
backgrounds met the criteria of the caucus, (these criteria were
not easily obtainable), they would recommend their names to the
group that would accept that they be given arms if there were no
further objections. Any objection from the core group would
disqualify the arming of any militant. The terms were that any
such militant should be disciplined, ready to sacrifice, vigilant
in his actions and prepared to return the arms immediately after
the action for which they had been issued. It is difficult to
ascertain where the arms came from but the following statement
will give us more insight into this issue: "One AK 47 witftr •*
magazines of ammunition and 6 grenades costs a bag of dagga. 5
From discussion with Mr V, it appeared that this dagga was
exchanged with Coloured people who had such arms.
Another method was that of calling mass meetings at KTC to inform
the people about a possible onslaught so as to prepare them for
defence. At such meetings, resolutions would be taken to consult
lawyers to prepare interdicts against police and vigilantes, to
guard KTC day and night and to protect the leadership. From then
onwards, ' the alliance between the youth and the elders was
cemented. However, the youth, in carrying their duties,
overstretched their powers beyond guarding KTC and its leadership.
For example, during their duties they would send some of the
guards to the nearby shebeens and shops to demand liquor and
money. Their patrons also silently gave in to their requests.
Taxis were similarly transporting them to their destinations free
of charge. Strangers who used KTC as a short-cut to different
parts of the township were stopped and asked who they were so as
to determine whether they were spying for the 'fathers', police
or vigilantes. These young militants would, after realising the
innocence of the suspects, apologise and inform them that they
were doing this because 'Beirut' was under threat of attack.
Indeed, KTC became known as 'Beirut' among the township youth who
frequented KTC. But in the end, their defence methods were no
match against the police and vigilante attack.
Vigilantes
The state's attempt to intervene in urban politics through the
creation of right wing gangs was a significant development in the
mid 80s. In the buses, trains and taxis to the working class
areas, people asked questions about this issue. Their comments
were examples not only of the nature of their experience but also
of their consciousness. Some comments indicated reactionary
despair,
"Agh! We blacks will never be free! On
the one hand we say we want our country back
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from the white man. Look now what's happening.
We are killing ourselves/ the vigilantes are
against the comrades. Blacks are so stupid, it
is no wonder our struggle is so long."
Others were moralistic, perhaps church-inclined when they
saw this struggle as an indication of the impemding Doomsday and
quoted from the Bible, "Nations will revolt against nations,
children against their parents. Oh! my people! Jesus is coming,
let us give ourselves to God!"
But there were also those who expressed their frustrations with
capitalism through oppositional structures such as trade unions,
youth, women and civic organisations where they developed a
deeper political understanding of oppression and exploitation.
This both widened and deepened the base of opposition as well as
the general political consciousness in the townships. As the
troubles escalated and the working class continued to challenge
oppression and exploitation it found allies among the middle
classes. This eventually resulted in a crisis of control for the
government not because they lacked the ability to crush
opposition, but, as N. Haysom observed, "limited by potential
publicity and hindered by legal considerations in their ability
to perpetrate the deliberate terror and violence needed to combat
popular organisations"4", the state found the conservative
elements to be an alternative base for achieving their aims of
controlling the townships and curbing the influence of the
popular organisations.
The strategy was to draw the community organisations attention
away from the hard issues and to counter the attack from the
right. Haysom describes the vigilantes as "murderous gangs,
intent on intimidating, injuring or killing anti-apartheid
activists.47 The state's success in recruiting vigilantes was
equalled only by their success in portraying their deployment
against comrades as "black on black" violence in the media. The
phrase is associated with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, government
officials and state controlled media. The shallow and cynical use
of the. phrase to explain the work of vigilantes who attacked KTC
cannot hope to conceal the true nature of the vigilantes as the
ruthless and murderous allies of the government in its attempt to
repress and crush opposition to its policies and practices. The
destruction of KTC, revealed the involvement of the police and
army to all those who were there.
The destruction of KTC.
On the 9th June 1986 KTC became the centre of world attention.
Even people from Guguletu were taken by surprise when they saw
the smoke from KTC clouding the sky. The vigilantes had attacked
and destroyed KTC. Anyone who observed the actions of the
vigilantes (the witdoeke of Old Crossroads) will tell you how
they worked with the police. Anyone who observed the destruction
of KTC will not hesitate to tell you that, far from being "black-
on-black" violence, this was a complex strategy worked out by the
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state with the assistance of the conservative vigilante groups
recruited from Site C at Khayalitsha and Old Crossroads.
On the morning of 9th June 1986, as the vigilantes advanced from
the direction of Nyanga, with two casspirs behind them, the KTC
people, reinforced by residents of Guguletu, marched towards the
vigilantes. KTC people wanted to prevent them from destroying KTC
and entering the township. As the KTC columns moved forward, the
two casspirs, not the vigilantes, charged and fired tear gas to
disperse them. Some fell and broke their legs as the crowds
stampeded and trampled over each other to save their lives. While
those who had not fallen regrouped, they heard the screams of
those who were under fire. Each time the KTC people tried to push
back the vigilantes, the police would fire tear gas at them. As
people saw flames shoot up among the KTC houses, they heard the
sound of machine gun fire. This time not only the people but also
the army and the police were wondering what was taking place. The
vigilantes too, were shocked and began to shout: "Phumani!
Phumani! Bayadubula!" "Get out! Get out! They are shooting!"
In the middle of KTC, at the edge of the Masincedane shelters,
there were people with balaclavas charging the police and
vigilantes. It was difficult to ascertain why they had such
courage, but the sound of machine gun fire at intervals and the
withdrawal of the vigilantes was enough. By noon, the whole
Guguletu area seemed to have been taken by surprise. As people
were heading for KTC, the KTC people were fleeing their area.
Those with cars loaded them with more than they ever thought a
car could carry; those with vans or trucks offered them to people
helping the fleeing KTC residents. They loaned their vehicles but
refused to drive into KTC themselves. Instead they asked that
their vehicles be returned before sunset, "Please, comrades",
they pleaded.
While the residents of KTC were fleeing, the "balaclavas" were
running in groups of two, three or four, not afraid to go into
the most devastated areas. One of them came and cooled down the
people by saying, "Do not be afraid, comrades, take out the
clothes. We are around, we will tell you when they come this
side." It was difficult to tell who these people were and in the
panic, nobody asked who they were. By evening, it was quiet at
KTC as if nothing had happened. The majority of people fled
during the day and took refuge in the nearby houses. Hundreds
were injured, some badly; several were killed.
Conclusion
The struggles of 1983 brought the KTC squatters into
confrontation with the repressive organs of the state and
exposed them to the frustrations, tensions and the difficulties
of working together as a community with common interests in spite
of the differences in their backgrounds and experiences. The
militancy of the 'illegals' who challenged the police with sticks
supported Bozzoli's observation that, 'the economic
identification is not the last word, but merely the first... it
is the political, social, cultural and ideological character of
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classes which renders them real and recognisable social
categories'. °
When Memani broke away from Ngxobongwana who lived like a chief
financed by the poor, little did he realise that the people who
supported him would not tolerate his behaving like a chief also.
It was the political influence and the militancy of the youth in
the KTC community that had not only defied Memani's behaving like
a chief but Siqhaza's behaving like a shark and demanding payment
for a site. Bill Freund observed this when he wrote, 'It is this
youth in these townships cut off from rural life, not the migrant
workers and compound dwellers who have formed the most militant
and intense resistance to the state in recent years'. "
The KTC struggle is the case in point. There is no indication
that the state has dropped its strategy of supporting the right
wing vigilantes in an attempt to curb the influence of
progressive, young militants. And there is no reason to believe
that we have witnessed the last of KTC type battles.
Explanatory notes
* Beirut is the name used by the youth to indicate the militancy
of fighting apartheid supporters at KTC.
man* Bra is an appellation used in Xhbsa out of respect for a
older than the speaker but younger than his/her father.
* KTC stands for Khakhaza Trading Store that originally belonged to
a community councillor after which the KTC squatter settlement
derives its name.
* Masincedane means "Let us help one another".
* Sisi is a title in Xhosa for a woman who is older than the
speaker but younger than his/her mother.
* Youth Brigades were a People's Court at Nyanga, formed in 1985.
It started as a group of concerned yo,uth who wanted to stop
tsotsis from switching street lights off at night and rob
people. When they arrested and punished the tsotsis concerned,
their popularity surged like fire. People took their cases to
them. However the arrest and punishment of the Sogiba daughter
who was a Community Councillor spoilt their reputation. They
were given severe punishment for being rude and defying the
'Youth Brigades'. This led to the arrest of nine of their
leaders and later charges by the South African Court. Since
then their reputation ebbed down.
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